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TELLING THE TIME OF HUMAN DEATH BY
STATUTE: AN ESSENTIAL AND PROGRESSIVE
TREND
A. CHRISTIAN COMPrON*
The Need for Time-of-Death Legislation
Advancement in the field of medical science, especially in the
development of methods to maintain artificially the functions neces-
sary to prolong life, is at least partly responsible for widening the gap
between the medical and legal determinations of death. To establish
the time of death for the purpose of applying criminal law, tort law,
or the law of descent and distribution, the courts heretofore have
generally relied upon the traditional criteria of "a total stoppage of
the circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the animal and vital
functions consequent thereto such as respiration and pulsation, etc."'
For example, in Schmitt v. Pierce,2 an action for declaratory judg-
ment to determine distribution of an estate, the issue was whether a
husband and wife, who died in or soon after a motor vehicle collision,
died simultaneously or whether one survived the other. Citing the
foregoing definition of the time of death,3 the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri affirmed the action of the trial court which found that the wife
survived the husband. The evidence tended to show that although the
wife sustained a severe skull fracture, she continued to breathe for a
short time after the husband's death, emitted a few groans, and bled
slightly. In Smith v. Smith,4 a will construction case also involving
the issue of simultaneous death, the husband died at the scene of the
automobile accident but the wife remained unconscious from the
time of the accident until her death seventeen days later. The court
rejected the argument that the husband and wife died at the same
time, cited the traditional definition of death, took judicial notice of
the fact "that one breathing, though unconscious, is not dead,"I and
found that the wife survived the husband.'
*Justice, Supreme Court of Virginia, A.B. 1950, LL.B. 1953, Washington and Lee
University. This article was prepared while Mr. Justice Compton was a Judge of the
Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia.
IBLAcK's LAW DICrIONARY 488 (4th ed. 1968).
2344 S.W.2d 120 (Mo. 1961).
1Id. at 133.
'229 Ark. 579, 317 S.W.2d 275 (1958).
1Id. at 589, 317 S.W.2d at 281.
'For other cases relying on the same definition, see In re Estate of Schmidt, 261
Cal. App.2d 262, 67 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1968); Thomas v. Anderson, 96 Cal. App.2d 371,
215 P.2d 478 (1950).
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The traditional definition of death adopted and applied so single-
mindedly by the courts is out of step with newer medical concepts,
particularly that of "brain death": the complete and irreversible loss
of all functions of the brain.7 While it seems that a majority of the
medical profession is of the opinion that irreversible loss of brain
function must be an element in the determination of the time of
death of a human being, there is much difference of opinion over what
should be the specific criteria for determining brain death.' The most
notable criteria are those established in 1968 by the Ad Hoc Commit-
tee to Examine the Definition of Brain Death of The Harvard Medi-
cal School This group concluded that an organ, including a brain,
which no longer functions and has no possibility of functioning again
is for all practical purposes dead. The group identified its first prob-
lem to be a determination of the characteristics of a permanently
nonfunctioning brain. It reported that a patient in that state appears
to be in deep coma and that the condition can be diagnosed as fol-
lows:1' unreceptiveness and unresponsiveness, that is to say, total
unawareness of externally applied stimuli and inner needs; absence
of spontaneous respiration and elicitable reflexes; and an isoelectric
(flat) electroencephalogram. The Committee stated that tests deter-
mining the foregoing conditions should be conducted at least twice,
twenty-four hours apart." It further reported that the validity of the
tests as an indicator of irreversible cerebral damage depended upon
excluding the effects of accidental hypothermia 2 and central nervous
system depressants, such as barbiturates.
While the debate continues within the medical profession as to the
7For an exhaustive discussion of the medical definition of death past and future,
see Comment, The Criteria For Determining Death in Vital Organ Transplants-A
Medico-Legal Dilemma, 38 MISSOURI L. REV. 220, 221-24 (1973).
11d. at 224.
'Ad Hoc Committee of The Harvard Medical School to Examine The Definition
of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J.A.M.A. 337 (1968). See Cap-
ron & Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Standards For Determining Human Death:
An Appraisal and A Proposal, 121 U. PENN. L. REV. 87, 89 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Capron & Kass].
"0205 J.A.M.A. at 337-38.
"Cf. note 69 infra, for the text of a proposed amendment to the Virginia time-of-
death statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 32-364.3:1 (Cum. Supp. 1973), which would require
EEG tracings to be run twenty-four hours apart.
12205 J.A.M.A. at 337-38. Accidental hypothermia is defined as the "unintentional
and dangerous fall in body temperature on exposure to a cold environment . . . [It]
may occur in infants and in the newborn, particularly during operations and may also
occur in the elderly." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 611 (22d ed. 1972). (All further
medical definitions taken from STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY).
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specific criteria to be used in determining brain death, this newly
recognized concept is causing continued difficulty in those jurisdic-
tions in which the courts feel compelled to rely on the traditional
concept of death in the absence of legislation sanctioning the newer
concept. This difficulty relates not only to the obvious problems of
criminal and civil liability of physicians engaged in the transplanta-
tion of vital organs or of persons practicing euthanasia, but also to
the more bizarre problem of possible interference with the criminal
prosecution of those charged with initially injuring a victim-donor. 3
Illustrative of this latter problem is the case recently reported by
the Associated Press from Oakland, California." The kidneys and
heart of a shooting victim were transplanted to three dying persons
at Stanford University Medical Center on September 12, 1973, after
tests showed the victim to have "no brain activity" according to the
criteria of the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee. The victim had been shot
once in the head with a .22 caliber bullet, and it is reported that the
coroner ruled that the cause of death was the single bullet to the
brain. After the shooting, the victim's heart and kidneys were kept
functioning artificially by "machines" until the organs to be trans-
planted were removed from his body. The assailant was charged with
first degree murder and the defense attorney is quoted as saying,
"How could he be dead [from the gunshot wound] when his heart
was beating?" The prosecuting attorney is reported to have observed
that since California has no statutory definition of the time of death
and since the decided cases use a standard law dictionary definition, 5
The logical extension of that definition is that as long as you
can maintain the function of just one organ, you have life.
Something short of that pretransplant definition must be de-
veloped. Otherwise every transplant case is a criminal homi-
cide and the doctor who removes a heart is guilty of murder.
The problem of the gap between medical and legal concepts of the
time of death with respect to the civil liability of physicians was
acutely presented in Virginia in 1972 in Tucker's Administrator v.
Lower,'6 in which the author was the trial judge. The case is believed
to be the nation's first damage suit involving a heart transplant which
proceeded to final judgment wherein the central issue was a determi-
'138 MISSOURI L. REV. at 231-32.
"Richmond (Va.) Times Dispatch, Sept. 15, 1973, at 13, col. 4, commented upon
editorially in Richmond (Va.) News Leader, Oct. 27, 1973, at 2, col. 1; Roanoke (Va.)
Times, Dec. 2, 1973, at 1, col. 1. See also TIME, Dec. 31, 1973, at 49.
'"Note 1 supra.
"No. 2831 (L. & Eq. Ct. of the City of Richmond, May 25, 1972).
1974]
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nation of the time of death. This action was brought under the Vir-
ginia Death By Wrongful Act statute,'" and recovery in the amount
of $100,000 was sought for the alleged wrongful death of a heart and
kidney donor." Although a number of persons, including the whole
heart transplant team of the Medical College of Virginia Hospital,
were originally named as defendants in the suit brought by the
brother of the donor, the case evolved into a proceeding against the
three surgeons who participated in the heart transplant and an As-
sistant State Medical Examiner who purported to give permission for
use of the heart and kidneys when no relatives or next of kin of the
donor could be found.'
9
A determination of the meaning of the word "death" as used in
the Death by Wrongful Act statute resulted in a focus upon the ques-
tion of the time of death as the central issue in the case. The plaintiff
claimed that the donor was alive at the time the heart and kidneys
were removed because vital signs of life were normal. The defendants
contended that because the brain of the donor had previously suffered
total and irreversible damage in an accidental fall, he was dead prior
to the time any transplantation procedures began. The Assistant
Medical Examiner and the surgeon who implanted the donor's heart
in the body of the recipient were sued upon allegations which essen-
tially alleged that they participated in a civil conspiracy to obtain
wrongfully the donor's heart and kidneys for the recipient's use."0
'7VA. CODE ANN. § 8-633 (1957 Repl. Vol.) provides in part:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act
... of any person ... and the act ... is such as would, if death had
not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action...
and to recover damages in respect thereof, then, and in every case, the
person who ... would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall
be liable to an action for damages ....
"This synopsis of the case is prepared from the original court papers and from the
notes of the writer taken during the course of the trial. A court reporter recorded the
trial proceedings, but since no appeal was taken the transcript was not prepared.
19A second count of the plaintiff's complaint sought an additional $900,000 dam-
ages for the alleged unlawful invasion of a near-relative's rights with respect to a dead
body. 22 AM. JuR.2d Dead Bodies §§ 6, 36 (1965). A plea of the statute of limitations
was sustained in pretrial proceedings and the count was dismissed. See Order, Tucker's
Adm'r v. Lower, entered Nov. 3, 1971. For a discussion of the subject of vital organ
transplantation as it relates to the legal rights in a dead body, see Note, Organ Trans-
plantation and Donation: A Proposal For Legislation, 10 WM. & MARY L. REv. 975
(1969).
2'"For critical comment upon the case, see Note, Determining the Time of Death
of the Heart Transplant Donor, 51 N.C. L. REV. 172 (1972); 38 MISsoURI L. REV. at
220, 230, 233; 121 U. PENN. L. REV. 88, 98-100, 117; Christofferson, Defining Death, 39
POPULAR GOVERNMENT 10 (1972).
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The plaintiff's evidence showed that his decedent, an adult male,
was brought unconscious to the emergency room of the Medical Col-
lege of Virginia Hospital in Richmond at approximately 6:00 p.m. on
May 24, 1968. He had suffered a fall at another location in the City.
Upon examination, the patient was found to have sustained severe
head injuries, including a large right-sided lateral basilar skull frac-
ture. He was admitted to the neurological service of the hospital and,
upon further examinations and tests, a diagnosis of a subdural hema-
toma (collection of blood between the skull and the brain) and a brain
stem contusion (bruise) was made. Surgery, including a craniotomy
(opening into the skull) and a tracheotomy (opening into the wind
pipe), was also performed at 11:00 p.m. the same day.
Following this operation, which was completed about 2:05 a.m. on
May 25, the patient left the operating room in slightly better condi-
tion and was placed in the recovery room. There he was fed intrave-
nously and received medication each hour until 11:30 a.m., when he
was placed on a respirator which kept him "mechanically alive." At
11:45 a.m., the treating physician noted that "[the] prognosis for
recovery is nil and death imminent." At 1:00 p.m. on that day, a
neurologist was called upon to obtain an electroencephalogram
(EEG) to determine the state of the patient's brain activity. Between
1:00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m. he examined the decedent and made a single
EEG recording which showed flat lines with occasional artifact (no
brain activity). He found no clinical evidence of viability (capability
of living) and no evidence of cortical (outer brain) activity. Based
upon this examination, he was of the opinion that the patient was
then dead from a neurological standpoint. At the same time, the
neurologist also found that the patient's heart was beating and that
his body temperature, pulse, and blood pressure were all normal for
a patient in his condition. In his opinion, the decedent's brain was
"dead" prior to the time he ran the EEG. The patient showed no
evidence of being able to breathe spontaneously at all; the respirator
was doing all the breathing. The neurologist was also of the opinion
that it was "very likely" the patient's condition was "irreversible" at
the time he was admitted to the hospital on May 24.
At 2:45 p.m., the patient was taken back into the operating room
in preparation for the removal of his heart and both kidneys. He was
receiving oxygen to continue the viability of certain organs. From this
time until 4:30 p.m., he maintained vital signs of life, that is, he
maintained, for the most part, normal body temperature, normal
pulse, normal blood pressure, and normal rate of respiration. During
the same period, he was receiving solutions of dextrose and saline to
furnish nourishment to the organs. At 3:30 p.m., the respirator was
1974]
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cut off and at 3:35 p.m., the patient was pronounced dead by his
attending physician. At 4:25 p.m., the incision was made to remove
the heart and it was taken out and placed in the body of the recipient
by his treating physician who had made the incision in the recipient
at 3:33 p.m. At 4:33 p.m., the incision was made to remove the
donor's kidneys which were also transferred immediately to the recip-
ient.
At trial the plaintiff presented evidence showing that the viability
of organs can and does continue with mechanical and other assistance
long after the brain ceases to function, from which a jury could prop-
erly infer that had the respirator not been cut off and his heart and
kidneys removed, the donor could have "lived" at least a day or
probably longer. Upon the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the court
overruled the defendant's motion to strike the evidence and to enter
summary judgment in favor of the defendants as a matter of law.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
guided by case law precedents using the "traditional" concept of the
time of death,"- and not having any Virginia legislation on the subject
of the time of death, 2 the court determined that the plaintiff had
established a prima facie case. 3
Thereafter during the course of the defendant's evidence, a num-
ber of neurologists and neurosurgeons testified in support of the con-
cept of brain death and its general acceptance by the medical profes-
sion. They expressed the opinion that the death of the plaintiff's
decedent occurred when his brain died, which was at least two hours
before his heart and kidneys were removed. Among the medical wit-
nesses for the defendants was Dr. William Sweet, a member of the
Harvard Ad Hoc Committee. 24 He had reviewed the decedent's hospi-
tal record, including the EEG tracings, and was of the opinion that
the patient was dead at the time of the examination by the neurolo-
gist because the brain was dead.
Evidence of the non-medical aspects of the case, including expert
testimony reflecting theological and philosophical views, was also
offered. Testifying for the defendants was Dr. Joseph Fletcher2 1 who
2 Note 1 supra; Note, Providing Human Organs for Medical Transplant, 26 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 58, 68 (1969). See also Kusanovich, Medical Malpractice Liability and
the Organ Transplant, 5 U. SAN. FRAN. L. REV. 223, 240 (1971).
2Virginia enacted time-of-death legislation in 1973. See note 46 infra.
2'Memorandum Opinion in No. 2831 (L. and Eq. Ct. of the City of Richmond, May
23, 1972).
2 See note 9 supra.
'Former Professor of Theology at Episcopal Theological Seminary, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, and then visiting Professor of Medical Ethics at the University of
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stated, in part, 6 that he was then engaged in supervising medical
students in clinical situations from the theological and philosophical
point of view; that, in his opinion, modern medicine has made the
understanding of death simpler; that "life" is not simply a biological
function; and, that actually there is no way to define "life;" that from
an ethical point of view a person is "rationality;" that for there to be
a person there must be some capacity to communicate, some sense
of time, some memory, and some sense of the past; and that the parts
of the anatomy determine whether there is a person, with brain func-
tion being of the first priority. He stated that the "classical" defini-
tions of death using only respiration, circulation, and pulse as cri-
teria, viewed in the light of modern medicine from the theological and
philosophical point, are "outmoded" and "simplistic" because "the
essential element of death is the loss of brain function."
The dilemma of the trial judge in a case such as Tucker is obvious.
He is confronted on the one hand with the doctrine of stare decisis
based on an apparently archaic or incomplete legal definition of
death, 7 and on the other with forceful and clear evidence as to the
present uniform acceptance by the medical profession of irreversible
brain damage as a criterion for death. In resolving the dilemma, the
court was forced to revise the conclusion reached after only the plain-
tiff's evidence had been heard that the "traditional" definition
should control. Instead, it was decided to instruct the jury to consider
the evidence in light of the several bases for determining death as
disclosed by all the testimony, including but not restricted to perma-
nent loss of all brain function.2 8 After a trial lasting seven days, the
Virginia. Dr. Fletcher is the author of Morals and Medicine (1960) and Situation Ethics
(1966) and is an advocate of euthanasia. See note 38 infra.
2qhis summary has been also compiled from the writer's notes taken during the
trial and is not a complete verbatim account, although it is reasonably accurate.
1'Note I supra. See also Wasmuth, The Medical, Legal and Ethical Considerations
of Human Organ Transplantations, 11 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 636, 652 (1970). For a
concise statement of the implications of the concept of cerebral death, see Toole, The
Neurologist and the Concept of Brain Death, 14 PERSPECrIVES IN BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE
599 (1971).
"Instruction No. 7:
The court instructs the jury that you shall determine the time of death
in this case by using the following definition of the nature of death.
Death is a cessation of life. It is the ceasing to exist. Under the law,
death is not continuing but occurs at a precise time and that time
must be established according to the facts of each specific case.
In determining the time of death, as aforesaid, under the facts
and circumstances of this case, you may consider the following ele-
ments, none of which should necessarily be considered controlling,
although you may feel under the evidence that one or more of these
1974]
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jury" deliberated about an hour and found in favor of the defendants.
The foregoing cases indicate that uniform state legislation recog-
nizing brain death as a means for determining the time of death of a
human being is necessary in order to achieve stability and certainty
in certain areas of our criminal, tort, and inheritance law.30 Further-
more, the treatment and maintenance of the incurably ill person are
also vitally affected by the lack of uniform statutory criteria for deter-
mining the time of death. Euthanasia, or "mercy-killing," is the term
commonly applied to the act of deliberately terminating or shorten-
ing for humanitarian reasons the life of someone suffering from an
acute and incurable mental or physical disorder . 3 It is apparent that
the foregoing broad definition spawns many questions for which the
answers make one either a proponent or an opponent of euthanasia
for that purpose. For example, what is the meaning to be attributed
to the word "deliberate"? Is a valid distinction to be made between
"terminating" and "shortening" a person's life? Should "humanitar-
ian" motives be any justification for the practice of euthanasia and,
if so, what is the proper scope of inquiry as to what is humane?
Finally, if it is believed that some form of euthanasia, however lim-
ited, should be allowed, what safeguards are to be provided to insure
conditions are controlling: the time of the total stoppage of the circu-
lation of the blood; the time of the total cessation of the other vital
functions consequent thereto, such as respiration and pulsation; the
time of complete and irreversible loss of all function of the brain; and,
whether or not the aforesaid functions were spontaneous or were being
maintained artificially or mechanically.
Overlooked by those who have commented on the instruction is the fact that in
the first three sentences, the court implicitly directed the jury to consider the theologi-
cal, sociological, and philosophical ramifications of the evidence adduced at the trial,
along with the medical evidence. Unfortunately, some of the criticism of the action of
the court in adopting the brain death concept in its charge to the jury appears to have
resulted from lack of full information, or misinformation, about the facts of the case
developed by the defendants or from a failure to consider the basic requirement that
the law set forth in a jury charge must be founded upon the evidence. See, e.g., Death
With Dignity-Hearings Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, S. Doc. No. 83-
683, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings]; Capron &
Kass, supra note 9, at 99.
2The jury was comprised of a mechanical engineer, a Western Union clerk, a state
tax examiner, a banker, a sales manager, an accountant, and a stockbroker.
'For an article which recognizes the practical problems of the courts in the areas
of medical malpractice and the criminal liability of physicians participating in trans-
plantation and of the assailants of victims whose vital organs are subsequently trans-
planted, see Hillman & Aldridge, Towards A Legal Definition of Death, 116 SoTocrroR's
JOURNAL 323 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Hillman & Aldridge].
'Gurney, Is There A Right to Die?-A Study of the Law of Euthanasia, 3 CUMBER.-
SAM. L. REV. 235 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gurney].
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against its abuse, either by a simple error of the medical profession
in diagnosing the incurability of the affliction, or by the inability of
the patient to make a rational decision, or by a conspiracy to kill the
patient prematurely? I do not purport to answer all these questions
within the narrow scope of this article, but I raise them in order to
show the possible effect of time-of-death legislation on the answers.
It should be stated that, at least theoretically, the practice of any
form of euthanasia is a crime.2 The principle of the criminal law
involved, of course, is that "[i]f any life at all is left in the human
body, even the least spark, the extinguishment of it is as much homi-
cide as the killing of the most vital being." Moreover, it has been
said that neither the consent of the victim, the extremity of his suffer-
ing, or the imminence of his death may be pleaded in defense to a
charge of homicide.3 4 However, it is undeniable that in practice a
distinction has evolved between voluntary euthanasia, applied with
the consent of the patient, and involuntary euthanasia. As to the
latter, apparently the memories of Nazi Germany are far too vivid to
permit any serious advocacy of formal legalization. 5 Nevertheless,
even in cases of involuntary euthanasia, juries have been notably
reluctant to find a defendant guilty of first degree murder, preferring
instead, where possible, to convict of a lesser included offense, impose
a minimal penalty, or acquit on grounds of insanity." Thus it is
apparent that a humanitarian motive-irrelevant according to the
formal law of homicide-is considered at least as a mitigating factor
in the application of that law. Furthermore, it could be argued that
involuntary euthanasia is practiced with impunity in those instances
where the family of a comatose patient makes a decision, whether for
humane or financial reasons, to discontinue extraordinary life-
supporting medical aid. The question which readily comes to mind
is whether there is a crucial difference between that decision made
by the family of the patient and the same decision, perhaps for differ-
ent but no less altruistic reasons, made by the medical staff of a
hospital when no members of the family can be found.
In addition to the distinction between voluntary and involuntary
euthanasia, a further distinction has developed between "active" and
"passive" euthanasia. If one affirmatively acts to shorten or end an-
32Id. at 238.
"State v. Francis, 152 S.C. 17, 149 S.E. 348, 364 (1929); see 40 AM. JuR. 2d
Homicide § 16 (1968).
"Sanders, Euthanasia: None Dare Call It Murder, 60 J. CRIM. L. 351, 352 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Sanders].
21See Gurney, supra note 31, at 237.
31See Sanders, supra note 34, at 355-56 n.36(a), (b), (d), (e), (g), & (k).
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other's life, even with the other's consent, the act is often considered
homicide.3 7 If, by contrast, one fails to provide treatment which would
prolong the life of an incurably ill person, even without that person's
consent, he is seldom deemed culpable. It has been said that euthan-
asia is now widely practiced by omission, i.e., the suffering of the
adult victim of a painful and incurable condition is ended by letting
the patient die."
The distinction between active and passive euthanasia appears to
be especially pertinent to the' conduct of medical doctors; yet this
distinction is tenuous at best, turning, it seems, on a further distinc-
tion between "customary" and "extraordinary" treatment which
appears to be inapposite. In other words, once the doctor-patient
relationship is established, the doctor's failure to provide the custom-
ary treatment for his patient is viewed as an act of homicide if the
patient dies; but his failure 'to administer extraordinary treatment,
e.g., to put or keep the patient on a kidney machine or in an iron lung,
is regarded as a condonable omission.39 However, it is clear that as a
matter of logic turning off a mechanical respirator is more properly
regarded as an "act" than the failure to provide ordinary treatment.
One might seek to eliminate this trap of illogic by condoning the
failure to put the patient on the mechanical respirator in the first
place but condemning his removal from it once he is on; but this
approach would cause guilt to turn on the fortuitous circumstance
that extraordinary treatment is sometimes administered immedi-
ately by the doctor without consent of the patient or his family in
order to save the patient's life, leaving the decision as to his future
for a later and calmer time. Finally, if the rationale for the distinction
1See, e.g., Gurney, supra note 31, at 239 and his discussion of People v. Roberts,
211 Mich. 187, 178 N.W. 690 (1920), wherein the defendant was found guilty of murder
for mixing poison and placing it within reach of his incurably ill wife.
However, there seems to be a limitation on condemnation of even active euthana-
sia in the case where a drug, such as morphine is administered primarily for the
purpose of relieving pain but has the incidental and inevitable effect of shortening life.
Gurney at 241-43.
3Survey, Euthanasia: Criminal, Tort, Constitutional and Legislative
Considerations, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1202, 1213 (1973); Senate Hearings, supra note
28, at 34-35. See also transcript of a stimulating panel discussion upon the topic of
"Matters of Life and Death," January, 1972, meeting of the Virginia Bar Association,
reported in LXXXIII REPORTS, Va. Bar Ass'n 33, at 41-42, 56. The participants with
Dr. Joseph Fletcher were Walter J. Wadlington, professor of law of the University of
Virginia School of Law, Thomas H. Hunter, M.D., former Dean of the University of
Virginia Medical School, and Richard L. Williams, a prominent trial attorney who is
now a Virginia Circuit Judge. See also Sanders, supra note 34, at 351 n.6.
"Gurney, supra note 31, at 247-48.
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between active and passive euthanasia is that such a distinction de-
termines the guilty intent of a course of conduct, this rationale is
-inconclusive. The failure to provide ordinary care could be due either
to negligence or malice; and the elimination of extraordinary treat-
ment could be motivated by negligence, malice, or humanitarian
considerations.
Thus it has been seen that traditional distinctions between volun-
tary and involuntary euthanasia and active and passive euthanasia,
while neat semantically, do not always neatly divide all fact situa-
tions into the two categories of guiltless death and crime. Of course,
if the ultimate good sought to be attained through the proscription
of euthanasia is the preservation of human life in any form, it is
obvious that the distinctions between voluntary and involuntary and
active and passive are inconsequential. If, however, one views the
ultimate good as the preservation of human life with a certain quality
of form, then the foregoing distinctions are pertinent to the issues
raised by the concept of euthanasia but do not seem to resolve them.
Rather, I would submit that legislation of uniform application
which establishes by specific criteria the time of death is much more
effective in resolving these issues. Thus, if the patient is already dead
according to the criteria and procedures of the statutes to be dis-
cussed infra, he is incapable of consent to the discontinuance of either
ordinary or extraordinary medical aid. Moreover, neither acts nor
omissions would appear to be of any legal consequence to a dead
body." Furthermore, statutory criteria establishing the time of death
would have the salutary effect of eliminating, at least theoretically,
the apparent informal consideration by juries of the motive of the
defendant as affecting his criminal or civil liability. The only ques-
tion should be whether the patient had in fact been pronounced dead
according to the criteria and safeguarding procedures of the statute.
If so, the defendant would have a perfect defense, since homicide or
wrongful death obviously are not committed with respect to a person
already dead. If not, however, the defendant would presumably" be
liable. In short, the use of statutory criteria determining death would
seem to be a better means than is currently employed to infuse cer-
tainty into the law of criminal and civil liability in this area, at the
"Of course, tort actions in the nature of defacement of a dead body would still be
valid. Cf. note 19 supra.
"This assertion is made reservedly because even in a case where the statutory
criteria and procedures clearly have not been followed, the jury might take motive into
consideration. Possibly the only deterrent-and perhaps an ineffective one at that-to
such consideration would be a statute requiring an instruction that motive is not to
be considered in such cases.
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same time providing a legal outlet for the humane disposition of hard
medical problems.2
Time-of-Death Legislation to Date
Since 1970, the legislatures of only three states, Kansas, Mary-
land, and Virginia, have enacted statutes which establish criteria for
determining the time of death of a human being. This type of legisla-
tion has been called unique in the common law world." The Kansas
statute" became law on July 1., 1970, the Maryland statute45 on July
2Dr. James F. Toole, M.D., LL.B., Teagle Professor of Neurology, Bowman Gray
School of Medicine, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, co-
gently states the force and immediacy of one aspect of the problem facing the medical
profession:
We have all seen patients comatose for months or years, requiring
constant nursing care, expensive support systems, occupying scarce
hospital beds, and draining the family emotionally and financially
while the despairing physician prolongs this useless life hoping for
miraculous recovery, wouldn't it serve a greater good to certify such
patients dead before this happens?
Toole, supra note 27, at 602.
"Kennedy, The Kansas Statute on Death-An Appraisal, 285 NEw ENO. J. MED.
946 (1971).
"'KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-202 (Cum. Supp. 1973) provides as follows:
Definition of death. A person will be considered medically and
legally dead if, in the opinion of a physician, based on ordinary stan-
dards of medical practice, there is the absence of spontaneous respira-
tory and cardiac function and, because of the disease or condition
which caused, directly or indirectly, these functions to cease, or be-
cause of the passage of time since these functions ceased, attempts at
resuscitation are considered hopeless; and, in this event, death shall
have occurred at the time these functions ceased; or
A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the
opinion of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical prac-
tice, there is the absence of spontaneous brain function; and if based
on ordinary standards of medical practice, during reasonable attempts
to either maintain or restore spontaneous circulatory or respiratory
function in the absence of aforesaid brain function, it appears that
further attempts at resuscitation or supportive maintenance will not
succeed, death will have occurred at the time when these conditions
first coincide. Death is to be pronounced before artificial means of
supporting respiratory and circulatory function are terminated and
before any vital organ is removed for purposes of transplantation.
These alternative definitions of death are to be utilized for all
purposes in this state, including the trials of civil and criminal cases,
any laws to the contrary notwithstanding.
"MD. CODE ANN. art. 43, § 54F (Cum. Supp. 1973) provides:
When person considered medically and legally dead.
(a) A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, based
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1, 1972, and the Virginia statute46 on June 1, 1973. In Kansas, the
legislation has been codified in Article 2 entitled "Statutory Con-
on ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the absence of
spontaneous respiratory and cardiac function and, because of the dis-
ease or condition which caused, directly or indirectly, these functions
to cease, or because of the passage of time since these functions
ceased, attempts at resuscitation are considered hopeless; and, in this
event, death will have occurred at the time these functions ceased; or
(b) A person will be considered medically and legally dead if, in the
opinion of a physician, based on ordinary standards of medical prac-
tice and because of a known disease or condition, there is the absence
of spontaneous brain function; and if based on ordinary standards of
medical practice, during reasonable attempts to either maintain or
restore spontaneous circulatory or respiratory function in the absence
of spontaneous brain function, it appears that further attempts at
resuscitation or supportive maintenance will not succeed, death will
have occurred at the time when these conditions first coincide. Death
is to be pronounced before artificial means of supporting respiratory
and circulatory function are terminated and before any vital organ is
removed for purposes of transplantation.
(c) These alternative definitions of death are to be utilized for all
purposes in this State, including the trials of civil and criminal cases,
any laws to the contrary notwithstanding.
VA. CODE ANN. § 32-364.3:1 (Cum. Supp. 1973) provides:
When person deemed medically and legally dead.-A person shall
be medically and legally dead if, (a) in the opinion of a physician duly
authorized to practice medicine in this State, based on the ordinary
standards of medical practice, there is the absence of spontaneous
respiratory and spontaneous cardiac functions and, because of the
disease or condition which directly or indirectly caused these func-
tions to cease, or because of the passage of time since these functions
ceased, attempts at resuscitation would not, in the opinion of such
physician, be successful in restoring spontaneous life-sustaining func-
tions, and, in such event, death shall be deemed to have occurred at
the time these functions ceased; or (b) in the opinion of a consulting
physician, who shall be duly licensed and a specialist in the field of
neurology, neurosurgery, or electroencephlography, when based on the
ordinary standards of medical practice, there is the absence of sponta-
neous brain functions and spontaneous respiratory functions and, in
the opinion of the attending physician and such consulting physician,
based on the ordinary standards of medical practice and considering
the absence of the aforesaid spontaneous brain functions and sponta-
neous respiratory functions and the patient's medical record, further
attempts at resuscitation or continued supportive maintenance would
not be successful in restoring such spontaneous functions, and, in such
event, death shall be deemed to have occurred at the time when these
conditions first coincide. Death, as defined in subsection (b) hereof,
shall be pronounced by the attending physician and recorded in the
patient's medical record and attested by the aforesaid consulting phy-
sician.
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struction '4 7 of Chapter 77 on "Statutes." In Maryland the act is
found under the article of its Code entitled "Health" in the section
headed "Miscellaneous Provisions."4 In Virginia, the statute has
been codified within the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act.4" The Mary-
land and Virginia codifications within specialized sections seem in-
appropriate since the statutes by their terms are to be "utilized for
all purposes" in the states, including the trials of civil and criminal
cases.A0
The Kansas and Maryland statutes vary only slightly. Each pro-
vides in separate paragraphs that the time of death 5 may be deter-
mined either by the "absence of spontaneous respiratory and cardiac
functions" or by the "absence of spontaneous brain function."" Each
contains a caveat directing that cerebral death be pronounced before
"artificial means of supporting respiratory and circulatory function
are terminated" 3 and before the removal of any vital organ for trans-
plantation occurs. Neither requires a consulting physician for the
determination or pronouncement of cerebral death. Maryland re-
quires that a determination be made "of a known disease or condi-
tion '5 4 which results in the absence of spontaneous brain function
before a conclusion of cerebral death may be made. Kansas has no
such requirement.
The Virginia statute, adopted more recently than its counterparts
in Kansas and Maryland, contains certain refinements not found in
the latter. The painstaking manner in which the Virginia statute was
drafted and the facility with which it passed through the Virginia
General Assembly is significant when considered in light of the severe
Notwithstanding any statutory or common law to the contrary,
either of these alternative definitions of death may be utilized for all
purposes in the Commonwealth, including the trial of civil and crimi-
nal cases.
IlEg., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 77-201 to -203 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
"1E.g., MD. CODE ANN. art. 43, §§ 29-54G (Cum. Supp. 1973).
"E.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32-364.3 -.11 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
58See Capron & Kass, supra note 9, at 104 n.64.
"Some of the comments on this legislation incorrectly emphasize that the statutes
provide "definitions" of death. E.g., Hillman & Aldridge, supra note 30; Kennedy,
supra note 43. Even though the statutes refer to the "definitions" contained therein,
more precisely the legislation announces the time at which death has occurred as
determined by medical opinion. The legislation does not attempt to "define" the other
aspects of death involving theological, sociological and philosophical matters which
any purported complete "definition of death" must include. See Reeves, When Is It





criticism previously voiced of the Kansas statute.n The statute began
its legislative course in the House of Delegates of the General Assem-
bly about eight months after the judgment in Tucker.6 Its patron was
a surgeon whose legislative district included the City of Richmond.
57
The bill was reported out of committee58 without amendment by a
unanimous vote and passed each house of the General Assembly
unanimously without amendment.5 9 Hearings open to the public were
held before the committees of each house to which it was referred,
and no one spoke in opposition to the bill at either hearing. 0
The bill as offered was prepared after consultation with members
of the medical profession," including the principal draftsman of the
Kansas statute.12 One of the last changes made in the final draft
before the bill was introduced 3 was a requirement that the physician
before pronouncing death based on loss of brain functions must rule
out hypothermia64 and a drug-induced isoelectric (flat) EEG.65 This
-E.g., Capron & Kass, supra note 9, at 108-11. See generally Kennedy, supra note
43.
"H. Del. 1727 (Jan. 24, 1973).
57Dr. William Ferguson Reid of Richmond, Virginia.
UThe bill was initially referred to the House Courts of Justice Committee and was
reported out of that committee on February 12, 1973.
5The bill passed the House of Delegates on February 14, 1973, by a vote of 93-0.
Journal of The Virginia House of Delegates, 1973 Sess. 744. It passed the Senate on
February 21, 1973, by a vote of 39-0. Journal of The Virginia Senate, 1973 Sess. 617.
wZ'estifying in favor of the bill in committee were the patron, one of the draftsmen,
and the neurologist who ran the EEG on the plaintiff's decedent in the Tucker case.
Since there is little recorded information available concerning the legislative history
of this bill, I have compiled this synopsis chiefly by consultation with the principal
drafters of the Virginia bill, Messrs. John W. Crews and Theodore J. Markow, who
were Assistant Attorneys General of Virginia and counsel for some of the defendants
in Tucker's Adm'r v. Lower; and with State Senator Lawrence Douglas Wilder of
Richmond. Senator Wilder was one of counsel for the plaintiff in the Tucker case and
gave active support to the bill in the legislature.
"'Conversation with Mr. Crews, Jan. 4, 1974. The form the act should take was
discussed with leaders of the medical profession in Virginia. One of the draftsmen
spent most of one day discussing the bill with the then Chairman of the Department
of Surgery at the Medical College of Virginia Hospital, a Tucker defendant. The
Medical Society of Virginia and the Virginia State Board of Medicine were also con-
sulted. Opposition was voiced by some of these physicians to the enactment in any
form of legislative criteria to determine the time of death, their position being that the
issue is one of fact to be decided by the medical profession. Cf. text accompanying
notes 62-70 infra.
62Loren F. Taylor, M.D., J.D. See Taylor, A Statutory Definition of Death in
Kansas, 215 J.A.M.A. 296 (1971) (letter to the editor).
aConversation with Mr. Crews, Jan. 4, 1974.
"Note 12 supra.
"The brain is rendered "isoelectric" as the result of near lethal injury which
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specific requirement was deleted because it was felt that the consult-
ing physician would routinely take these conditions into account in
making his diagnosis. After the bill was offered, at least one legislator
representing a rural district voiced an objection to the requirement
for a consulting specialist since specialists are not always readily
available except in urban areas.6"
The result of this extensive consultation and careful drafting is a
Virginia statute which has been called
simple, all inclusive, and acceptable under all circumstances.
It demands proper pronouncement of death and yet protects
the physician involved.
6 7
The Virginia statute provides for the two concepts of death, brain
death and death as the result of cessation of spontaneous respiratory
and cardiac functions. There is no reference to the transplantation of
vital organs. A consulting physician who specializes in neurology,
neurosurgery, or electroencephalography is required for a determina-
tion of the time of cerebral death. The attending physician must be
duly authorized to practice medicine in Virginia, but the consultant
is not required to be licensed in the state. The statute asserts specifi-
cally that it applies "for all purposes" regardless of "any statutory
or common law to the contrary. . . "whereas the other two statutes
make generally "any laws to the contrary" inapplicable. The noun
"function" is plural throughout the Virginia Act whereas it is used
mostly in the singular in the other two." Finally, Virginia specifically
requires the patient's medical record to be considered in determining
cerebral death. 9
reverts its electrical activity to the null phase; that is, the chemical processes which
produce voltage fluctuations completely stop. Sedatives and anesthetics are two major
classes of pharmacological agents that produce major changes in the EEG. Each may
alter it in a manner resembling that associated with sleep or a coma. Other classes of
drugs with major effects on the brain produce only minor changes in the EEG, such
as cerebral stimulants, hallucinogens, and most of the tranquilizers. Gibbs & Gibbs, 3
Neurological and Psychiatric Disorders, Atlas of Electroencephalography 3,469 (1964).
"Conversation with Senator Wilder, Jan. 4, 1974.
'7Fatteh, A Lawsuit That Led To A Redefinition of Death, J. LEGAL MED.
July/Aug., 1973 at 30. Dr. Fatteh was a defendant in Tucker's Adm'r v. Lower.
"This change was deemed necessary to make the use of the word technically
correct from a medical standpoint since none of the systems involved (respiratory,
cardiac, and cerebral) operates as a unit. One physician observed that the brain "does
not stop and start like an engine." Note 60 supra.
"During its 1974 regular session, a bill was offered in the Virginia General Assem-
bly to amend subsection (b) of the Virginia statute in an apparent attempt to spell
out further procedural safeguards against the abuse of cerebral death determinations.
The pertinent section of the amendment states:
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Criticism of Time-of-Death Statutes
There has been persuasive objection to the enactment of legisla-
tion in any form to determine the time of death. Paradoxically, the
hesitation of the law-making process0 in most states to keep abreast
of this significant change in medical opinion and advancement in
medical science is being encouraged by the policy making body of the
American Medical Association (AMA). In December of 1973, the
House of Delegates of the AMA adopted the "Report of the Judicial
Council on Death" which recommended that ". . . at the present,
statutory definition of death is neither desirable or necessary." 7' To
set the stage for its recommendations, the AMA Report noted that
in June of 1973 at the AMA annual meeting, the Connecticut delega-
tion had urged a moratorium on "statutory definitions of death by
individual state legislatures . . ." and suggested that the Judicial
Council draft "a guiding and consensual principle 'which may be
acceptable to the medical profession throughout the country to rem-
. . . or (b) in the opinion of a consulting physician, who shall be duly
licensed, and a specialist in the field of neurology, -or neurosur-
gery,-when based on the ordinary standards of medical practice,
there is the absence of spontaneous brain functions and two electroen-
cephalographic tracings run twenty-four hours apart both meet the
criteria promulgated by the Ad Hoc Committee on Electroence-
phalographic Society for cessation of cerebral electrical activity,
which criteria shall not apply to persons suffering from certain phar-
macologic agents known to have a depressant effect on the central
nervous system, hypothermia, or electrolyte imbalance; or to infants,
when duly interpreted by a licensed physician and, in the opinion of
the attending physician and such consulting physician, based on the
ordinary standards of medical practice and considering the absence of
the aforesaid spontaneous brain functions and the patient's medical
record, further attempts at resuscitation or continued supportive
maintenance would not be successful in restoring such spontaneous
functions, and, in such event, death shall be deemed to have occurred
at the time when these conditions first coincide; provided, however,
that the attending physician and such consulting physician shall not
be the same individual. Death, as defined in subsection (b) hereof,
shall be pronounced by the attending physician and recorded in the
patient's medical record and attested by the aforesaid consulting phy-
sician.
The bill failed to pass the Senate (S.B. 215, Jan. 31, 1974).
,'During 1971 in at least three states, Florida, Illinois, and Wisconsin, bills to
establish a statutory definition of the time of death were pending. Capron & Kass,
supra note 9, at 88 n.4. No such legislation is found in the 1973 codes of those states,
so it may be assumed that the bills either failed to pass or are still pending.
71The full text of the report was obtained through the courtesy of the Department
of Medical Ethics, American Medical Association [hereinafter cited as AMA Report].
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edy the present situation and confusion regarding death.' "72
Prior thereto in May of 1970 the Connecticut State Medical So-
ciety had adopted a statement which permitted death to be deter-
mined "on the basis of complete and irreversible loss of function of
the entire brain" 73 in those patients whose cardio-respiratory system
was being supported artificially. The Connecticut statement further
provided that in the case of transplantation, "death of the donor
must be established by at least two physicians who are not involved
in such transplantation to the donee. ' '74 The AMA Report further
noted that in June, 1968, the AMA House of Delegates had approved
"Guidelines for Organ Transplantation," which provided that death
is to be determined by the clinical judgment of the physician who will
use "all the available currently accepted scientific tests. '75 The Re-
port commented that Kansas and Maryland have enacted statutory
definitions of death while other states have considered such legisla-
tion 6 and that the expected statutory protection of physicians from
legal problems which may arise when they declare someone to be
dead is "illusory" and "may expose them to greater risks. 7
Against this background provided by the AMA Report, the AMA
House of Delegates adopted the recommendations of the Report that
legislation defining death is not desired nor is it necessary; that local
medical associations urge their state legislatures to postpone enact-
ment of legislation defining death by statute; and that "[d]eath
shall be determined by the clinical judgment of the physician using
the necessary available and currently accepted criteria."78
The position taken by the AMA encourages uncertainty in the
areas of the law discussed herein" which vitally affect the public and
the medical profession. 0 Unfortunately, the AMA Report does not
give reasons supporting the opinion that the expected protection of a
statutory definition is "illusory" and may expose the physician to





'The report does not specifically mention the Virginia time-of-death statute,
supra note 46, so it cannot be determined from the report whether the ABA Judicial
Council considered the Virginia modifications of the Kansas and Maryland statutes.
See text accompanying notes 67-69 supra.
77AMA Report at 2.
781d.
71See text accompanying notes 30-42 supra.
"°For a more detailed argument in support of the need for legislation in this area,
see Capron & Kass, supra note 9, at 87-101.
"Note 77 supra.
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expression in the Journal of the American Medical Association 2
which concluded:
The meaning of death is clear, (sic) the problems which arise
relate to the accurate determination of the time of death, the
cause of death, or the occurrence of death. Except for obvious
instances, i.e., when a worker falls into a pit of molten steel,
these determinations are matters of different diagnoses, within
the exclusive expertise of physicians."
This view seems to be based on the proposition that a determination
of the time of death must be based upon detailed scientific criteria
which are not susceptible of being legislated.
It is submitted that statutes such as those enacted in Kansas,
Maryland, and Virginia, based upon a diagnosis resulting from recog-
nized medical findings, i.e., absence of spontaneous respiratory,
cardiac, or brain function and restoration thereof, afford protection
which is more than "illusory" and shelter the physician from, rather
than expose him to, greater risks. The traditional findings heretofore
relied on by the medical profession are incorporated into these stat-
utes and the new concept of brain death is included. With legislation,
the physician knows where he stands. He can make a diagnosis of
brain death knowing that it is recognized by the law, but he is not
restricted in the criteria which he uses to reach such diagnosis. Spe-
cific detailed scientific criteria for making such a diagnosis which
may change with the passage of time, such as absence of reflexes, flat
EEG, and lack of response to external stimuli, are not set forth by
the legislaton.8 4 While it may be true that legislation which attempts
to codify specific detailed criteria may be counter-productive because
it may restrict recognition of scientific development of new and better
standards, there is nevertheless a crucial need for more definitive
general rules to eliminate existing uncertainty in the determination
of the time of death.
Other responsible voices within the medical profession advocate
a prolongation of this uncertainty, but for slightly different reasons.
For example, Dr. Henry K. Beecher, Chairman of the Harvard Ad
Hoc Committee85 , has stated that time for further development of a
death definition is needed in the field of medicine before such defini-
"Bergen, Death, Definition and Diagnosis, 208 J.A.M.A. 1759 (1969).
"Id. at 1760.
"Curran, Legal and Medical Death-Kansas Takes The First Step, 284 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 260 (1971).
"See note 9 supra.
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tion is "frozen" into the law.8 He suggests that the medical definition
of brain death will be improved upon and that "it is too soon for
legislation."81 Dr. Beecher has urged his colleagues "to risk their
necks, go ahead and carry out what they believe to be right" when
making a determination of death. This bold course of conduct, how-
ever, would seemingly involve at least somewhat less hazard of legal
liability with the establishment of a general uniform statutory stan-
dard, however likely that standard is to become outdated.
General objections to time-of-death legislation have also been
keyed to purported defects in the process by which it is enacted.
Professor Kennedy states:
Let us have guidelines by all means. They are essential. But
let them be set down by the medical profession, not by the
legislature, so that the body best equipped to evaluate and
examine them can always have them under review, rather than
depend on the time-consuming and often whimsical processes
of the legislature.8 9
Such an argument presupposes a disinterested electorate and a recal-
citrant legislature. When even a small portion of the public becomes
interested in an issue, the legislative process can be quick to respond,
as demonstrated by the movement of the Virginia time-of-death stat-
ute through the Virginia General Assembly in less than thirty days. 0
The need to eliminate vagueness and provide stability in the areas
of the law affected by the phenomenon of death far outweighs the
foregoing sentiment against time-of-death legislation. With such leg-
islation, Doctor A making the diagnosis of brain death need not have
his civil or criminal liability depend upon whether a judge decides
that precedent in his jurisdiction based upon the traditional concept
not recognizing cerebral death requires the question of the time of
death to be decided against him as a matter of law, while another
court in the same jurisdiction in a similar case against Doctor B may
determine the same question to be one of fact as to which the trier of
the fact may reach a contrary result. Furthermore, the public interest
should not be overlooked in this medico-legal dilemma. The litigant
with a potential claim arising from a case of diagnosed brain death
suffered by his decedent should not be required to prosecute the
claim, with the attendant time and expense, surrounded by uncer-
"Senate Hearings at 63.
,1d.
nid.
"Kennedy, supra note 43, at 946-47.
"See text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
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tainty as to the eventual outcome depending upon whether a trial
court will adhere to legal precedent based on an outmoded medical
concept or whether it will allow consideration of current medical
opinion. Of course, the outcome of any particular litigation will often
be unpredictable, but the speculation as to the standards to be used
in these areas of the law can at least be lessened by the recognition
in statutory form of such a significant change in medical opinion.
In addition to general objections to any legislation on the subject,
there has been intelligent criticism of the specific form the legislation
has taken. This criticism has been directed to the Kansas statute '
but applies with equal force to the Maryland legislation92 since the
two acts are almost identical.93 The form has been called "an unfor-
tunate example" as a potential model for other states to follow. 4
Professor Capron and Dr. Kass state that the "primary fault with this
legislation is that it appears to be based on, or at least gives voice to,
the misconception that there are two separate phenomena of
death." 95 They observe that this division is especially unfortunate
because it seems to have resulted from an intention to establish a
special definition for organ transplantation which would not be
needed to determine the death of most persons." They state that it
is obvious that the Kansas statute was enacted to benefit the trans-
plant surgeon and may indicate that the welfare of the average pa-
tient is not as important to the State of Kansas as is the facilitation
of organ transplantation.97 They argue, as does Professor Kennedy,98
that the alternative definitions allow the inference that X at a certain
stage in the process of dying can be pronounced dead, whereas Y,
having arrived at the same point, is not said to be dead.99 Kennedy
expresses concern because the Kansas statute "does not serve to reas-
sure the person who may fear that during his last hours on earth his
doctors will be less concerned with his condition than with the person
earmarked to receive one of his vital organs." ' This criticism can
also be applied to the Virginia statute because it makes reference to
"Note 44 supra; Capron & Kass, supra note 9, at 108-11; Kennedy, supra note 43,
at 947-49.
"Note 45 supra.
"See text accompanying notes 51-54 supra.
"Kennedy, supra note 43, at 947.
"Capron & Kass, supra note 9, at 109.
"Id. at 109-10.
"Id. at 110.
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alternative definitions of death.'0'
However, it would seem that these abstract objections have-little
practical merit. From a fair reading of the foregoing statutes, it is
apparent that the "alternative definitions" therein relate not to sepa-
rate types of death but to the several methods to be used to make one
diagnosis, and to reach one legal determination, i.e., the time when
death occurs. In other words, a person is dead when the criteria of
either of the two definitions of the time of death are satisfied.
Capron and Kass label "redundant" the statutory language which
speaks of a person being "medically and legally dead," saying that
its use mistakenly implies that the "medical" and "legal" definitions
could be different. 10 2 However, it seems to me that precisely the con-
trary is implied. In fact, the Virginia drafters intentionally placed
this phrase in their statute to emphasize that the medical and legal
determinations of the time of death are coextensive, despite the vary-
ing concepts of death. 03 While perhaps technically redundant, it
would seem that no harm is done to the form of the statute by the
use of "medically and legally dead" to give emphasis and indicate
intent.
While the foregoing specific objections apply with equal force to
the Kansas, Maryland, and Virginia statutes, the Virginia legislation
is not vulnerable to some of the other criticisms which have been
made. For example, Professor Kennedy notes that Kansas does not
require two physicians to pronounce death when the patient has been
kept alive artificially."4 He states that when such a patient may be a
potential donor for a vital organ transplant, a decision as important
as the pronouncement of his death should be made by two physi-
cians. 115 This criticism is valid and Virginia requires the death of an
artificially supported patient to "be pronounced by the attending
physician . .. and attested by the . . . consulting physician,"'0 6
thereby requiring the responsibility to be shared.
"'Note 46 supra.
'°2Capron & Kass, supra note 9, at 115 n.98.
"0Note 60 supra. Physicians themselves often have more than two concepts of
death. For example, the neurologist in Tucker who performed the EEG on the plain-
tiff's decedent testified that "neurological death" occurs when a patient is totally
unresponsive and there is no electrical activity of the brain. He also testified that he
recognizes three further types of death: "clinical death," defined by him as total
cessation of function of the central nervous system or brain; "biological death," which
he said is the death of a part of the body or a cell; and "theological death," which
according to his religious belief occurred when "the soul leaves the body." Note 18
supra.




Kennedy also argues that the Kansas act "seems to be drafted
only with transplantation surgery in mind" when the real problems
concerning the determination of the time of death involve terminally
ill and comatose patients who are not potential donors for a trans-
plant.107 The focus on transplantation in Kansas is, according to Ken-
nedy, apparent from the statute which provides that death is to be
pronounced before artificial support is terminated and "before any
vital organ is removed for purpose of transplantation."'0 8 This criti-
cism has some merit and the Virginia act does not contain such a
provision. It is general in its application and not specifically keyed
to transplant surgery, though its genesis was from the very real and
complex difficulties in a transplant damage suit.
Because of the careful scrutiny accorded the draft statute and its
unanimous acceptance when tested in the legislative process, the
Virginia act stands as an expression by the public in Virginia that
such legislation is necessary. Another inference which may be drawn
from the enactment of such a statute is that it represents a slight shift
in public opinion away from complete disapproval of legalized eu-
thanasia insofar as terminally ill patients are concerned.0 9
Conclusion
In summary, I believe that upon consideration of the law and its
need to change to adapt to significant social, philosophical, and med-
ical advancement, definitive uniform legislation is necessary in each
state on the subject of the determination of the time of death. Three
states have set the example and have taken the progressive step by
enacting such legislation. The statutes enacted to date may not be
perfect, but they afford some protection to the physician and public
alike.
As reflected in the case examples discussed, the problems revolv-
ing around a determination of the time of death are complex, and
their ramifications are not confined to the inner workings of the medi-
cal and legal professions. Therefore, I feel that the legal questions
arising from this issue should not be resolved either by medical opin-
ion or by judicial fiat on a case by case basis. Instead, the perimeters
of permissible conduct should be established by the people through
their legislators acting with appropriate consultants and providing
flexibility to accommodate the advent of new standards. In any
event, it is essential that there be a continuance of the present trend
of telling the time of human death by statute.
"'Kennedy, supra note 43, at 947.
"'Note 44 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 31-42 supra.
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